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INTRODUCTION
In Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission,1
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC) may not exclude products
manufactured abroad by a process involving starting material
patented in the United States. However, if any corporation used
the patented starting material to manufacture those same prod-
ucts on American soil it would constitute patent infringement.'
902 F.2d 1532, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1734 (Fed. Cir. 1990). This article will not discuss
Amgen's patent infringement suit against Genetics Institute, Inc. and its commercial
partner, Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d
1200, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
The manufacturing of a product within the United States by means of an unpat-
ented process using a patented product is infringement of an article claim. Roche Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861, 221 U.S.P.Q. 937, 939 (Fed Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Thus, a domestic enterprise
could not manufacture rEPO in the United States using Amgen's patented vectors and
1
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The decision effectively highlights the problems caused by In re
Durden,3 which held, in brief, that a well known process, even if
it uses novel starting material and produces a novel product, is
not patentable.4 This note argues that a legislative solution to
the Durden problem is required. To a significant extent, what is
at stake in this Durden quagmire is America's ability to remain
a leader in the biotechnology, 5 pharmaceutical and chemical
industries.
Amgen involved an action filed with the International Trade
Commission against Chugia Pharmaceutical Co. of Japan and its
U.S. subsidiary, Chugia Pharma U.S.A., Inc., for violation of for-
mer section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.' Amgen sought to pre-
vent Chugia Pharma U.S.A, Inc. from importing into the United
States recombinant erythropoietin7 (rEPO) made by a process"
host cells. Yet, according to Amgen, it is not unlawful to import products made abroad
by an unpatented process which includes the use of a patented product. Amgen, 902 F.2d
at 1540, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741. Conversely, the importation of a product "made by a
process patented in the United States" is an act of patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. §
271(g) (Supp. 1991). The International Trade Commission (ITC) has the power to ex-
clude products made abroad by a process patented in the United States. Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1991).
763 F.2d 1406, 226 U.S.P.Q. 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1408-09, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 362.
Biotechnology refers to "the collection of industrial processes that involve the use
of biological systems. For some industries, these processes involve the use of generally
engineered microorganisms." R. KING & STANFIELD, A DICTIONARY OF GENETICS 44 (3d ed.
1985).
1 Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, Title III, Part II, § 337, 46 Stat. 703 (current version
at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1983 & Supp. 1991)). Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 was
amended in 1935 by 19 U.S.C. § 1337a. The current version of 1337a is 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(a)(1)(B) (1983 & Supp. 1991).
7 Erythropoietin is a chemical secreted by the kidney that stimulates the release of
reticulocytes from bone marrow. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 487 (24th ed. 1982).
Recombinant erythropoietin is produced in a laboratory as opposed to naturally occuring
erythropoietin. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1533. Reticulocytes are young red blood cells.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1225 (24th ed. 1982). Proerythroblasts are red blood
cells with a nucleus, the immediate precursor of normal mature red blood cells. Id. at
1145. Erythrocytes are mature red blood cells. Id. at 485. Although the growth of a red
blood cell in reality is a continuous process, there are various labels given to each stage
of red blood cell development. For the purposes of this article it is sufficient to mention
the above three stages.
I A process is a method for achieving a particular result. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94
U.S. 780 (1877): "A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a
given result. It is an act or series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be trans-




covered under United States letters patent 9 No. 4,703,008.1
A machine is a thing. A process is an act, or a mode of acting. The one is visible to
the eye, . . . [t]he other is a conception of the mind, seen only by its effects when
being executed or performed. Either may be the means of producing a useful
result.
Id. at 728.
In Re Amtorg Trading Corporation, 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A 1935), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 576 (1935), provides a concise definition of both a product patent and a process
patent:
The product patent is upon an invented or discovered article; the process patent is
upon a method of making an article. It not infrequently happens that in the same
letters patent [an] invention is recognized in both the article and the method of
making it, but it is the well settled rule of law that a product patent protects only
the product, and that a process patent protects only the process.
Id. at 832.
' The term "Letters Patent" refers to the instrument that establishes evidence of
patent rights. PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.01. (2d ed. 1991).
The term derives from the Latin litterae patentes, which refers to a written instrument
which bears the seal of its author on the face of the instrument so that it could be read
without breaking the seal. Id.
A patent grants an inventor the right to exclude others from making, using or selling
a particular invention for seventeen years in exchange for public disclosure of informa-
tion regarding how to make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1984); Griffin v.
Keystone Mushroom Farms, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283, 1285 (D.C.Pa 1978). See also ER-
NEST B. LIPscoMa III, WALKER ON PATENTS 43 (3d ed. 1984). Upon expiration of a patent
the invention becomes public property. See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29
(1964), rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 985 (1964); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1974).
"o United States Patent No. 4,703,008 was issued on October 27, 1987. The '008 pat-
ent was issued out of U.S. Patent Application No. 675,298, which was filed on November
30, 1984. United States International Trade Commission, Initial Determination 114-15
(1989)(Investigation No. 337-TA-281). Amgen asserted that claims 2,4, 5-7, 23-25 and 27-
29 of its '008 patent as set forth below were violated:
2. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA se-
quence encoding human erythropoietin.
4. A procaryotic or eucaryotic host cell transformed or transfected with DNA se-
quence according to claim 1, 2, or 3 in a manner allowing the host cell to express
erythropoietin.
5. A biologically functional circular plasmid or viral DNA vector including a DNA
sequence according to claim 1, 2, or 3.
6. A procaryotic or eucaryotic host cell stably transformed or transfected with
DNA vector according to claim 5.
7. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA se-
quence encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid sequence sufficiently dupli-
cative of that of erthropoietin to allow possession of the biological property of
causing bone marrow cells to increase production of reticulocytes and red blood
cells, and to increase hemoglobin synthesis or iron intake.
23. A procaryotic or eucaryotic host cell transformed or transfected with DNA
1992]
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This case is of exceptional importance for several reasons."
First, this case deals with a genetic engineering 2 breakthrough.
sequence according to claim 7, 8, or 11 in a manner allowing the host cell to ex-
press said polypeptide.
25. A transformed or transfected mammalian host cell according to claim 24.
27. A transformed or transfected CHO cell according to claim 25.
28. A biologically functional circular plasmid or viral DNA vector including a
DNA sequence according to claim 7.
29. A procaryotic or eucaryotic host cell stably transformed or transfected with a
DNA vector according to claim 28.
Brief for Amgen Inc. at 4-5, Amgen Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532
(1990) (No. 89-1523).
" The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explicitly acknowledged the signifi-
cance of the decision: "Amgen has emphasized that the problem it has presented is 'one
of great importance and presents an issue of first impression for this or any other Court.'
It says we are faced with 'a precedent-setting question of exceptional importance.'"
Amgen v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1540, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1734, 1740 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
12 The '008 patent at issue in Amgen was the harvest of Dr. Lin's research in genetic
engineering. This branch of biotechnology involves the deliberate manipulation of ge-
netic material by modifying, deleting or adding the pieces of DNA called genes. RICHARD
V. KOWLEs, GENETICS, SOCIETY, AND DECISIONS 422 (1985).
Each cell in the human body contains a nucleus, which contains 46 chromosomes
that are grouped into 23 pairs. CECIL, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 122-23 (James B. Wyn-
gaarden & Lloyd H. Smith, Jr. eds, 17 ed. 1985). Chromosomes are made up of genes. Id.
A group of bases along the strand of a DNA molecule that contain hereditary informa-
tion is called a gene. GERARD J. TORTORA & NICHOLAS P. ANAGNOSTAKOS, PRINCIPLES OF
ANATOMY AND PHYSIOLOGY 65 (5th ed. 1987). A molecule of DNA consists of two strands
with crossbars. The strands twist around each other to form a double helix, which resem-
bles a twisted ladder. Id. at 40-41. The crossbars are called nucleotides (bases), of which
there are four nitogen bases: adenine, thymine, cystosine, and guanine. KARL DRLICA,
UNDERSTANDING DNA AND GENE CLONING: A GUIDE FOR THE CURIOUS 31 (1984). The
strands consist of two parts: sugar molecules (deoxyribose) and phosphate molecules.
Broadly stated, the process of genetic engineering consists of four main steps: (1) the
isolation and synthesis of the DNA segment or gene to be transferred; (2) the cloning of
the DNA segment; (3) the transfer of the DNA segment to the host cell or organism; and
(4) the stabilization of the DNA segment in its new surroundings. KOWLES, supra at 422.
Once the DNA sequence, in this case the gene for EPO, is isolated and synthesized
in vitro (in an artificial environment such as a laboratory test tube), the cloning process
may begin. Cloning refers to the production of millions of identical copies of a specified
gene or other fragment of DNA. Before this replication process can occur, recombination
techniques must be used to insert the gene sequence into a vector. A vector or shuttle
vector is a term that refers to the vehicle to which the chosen DNA fragment or gene is
joined or inserted so that the vector may carry the DNA fragment into the host cell.
URSULA GOODENOUGH, GENETICS 13-14, 502 (3d ed. 1987). Vectors are usually plasmids
and viruses. KOWLES, supra, at 422-23. The DNA fragment's destination is the host cell's
nucleus, where it will be incorporated into the host cell's chromosomes. GOODENOUGH,
supra, 13-14, 502. Subsequently, the host cell may construct the desired new trait by
using the foreign DNA. Id. The cloned organism will have the characteristics of the cell
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/14
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Dr. Fu-Kuen Lin of Amgen Inc."s was the first individual to
clone the erythropoietin gene and to express it by creating a
unique, "living host cell" to produce, for the first time, useful
quantities of erythropoietin." Amgen Inc. assigned Dr. Lin the
project of cloning the EPO gene and to insert it into host cells
which would produce large amounts of erythropoietin for the
purpose of treating people with anemia.15 There are staggering
technological changes occuring in the biotechnology field." Ad-
that was the source of the foreign DNA. Id. at 262; B. K. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGICAL Fu-
TURE, CONFRONTING THE GENETIC ERA 43 (1984).
,3 Amgen employs some 700 persons in Thousand Oaks, Ca. and Boulder Co. and
has an annual payroll of $30 million. 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 136 Cong. Rec. E. 852 (1990).
The company was the first to receive a U.S. patent relating to Granulocyte Colony Stim-
ulating Factor (G-CSF). Id. The product promises to aid the immune systems of cancer
patients undergoing chemotherapy. Id.
" Erythropoietin is a hormone secreted by the kidneys which stimulates the pro-
duction of red blood cells in bone marrow. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 430, 444
(24th ed. 1982); CECIL, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 501, 868-69 (James B. Wyngaarden &
Lloyd H. Smith, Jr. eds., 17th ed. 1985).
" Id. Recombinant erythropoietin has proved useful in treating patients suffering
from anemia. A person who has too few red blood cells is said to suffer from anemia. Red
blood cells carry oxygen to the tissues of the body. The lack of a sufficient number of red
blood cells results in reduced oxygen level in the blood. There is a wide variety of causes
of anemia. LouisE J. GORDY & ROSCOE N. GRAY, 3 ATTORNEY TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE §
60.00 (3d ed. 1990). Clinical studies have indicated that rEPO is especially effective in
treating the anemia that results from chronic renal failure (kidney failure). Eschbach,
Kelly, Haley, Abels & Adamson, Treatment of the Anemia of Progressive Renal Failure
With Recombinant Human Erthropoietin, THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE,
July 20, 1989, at 158. Evans, Rader, Manninen & The Cooperative Multicenter EPO
Clinical Trail Group, The Quality of Life of Hemodialysis Recipients Treated With Re-
combinant Human Erythropoietin, JAMA, Feb. 9, 1990, at 825.
A kidney disease could stem from infection, inflammation or high blood pressure. An
'insulin' for Anemia Sufferers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 12, 1989, at 13. Dis-
eased kidneys fail to clear waste from the bloodstream and fail to adequately produce
erythropoietin. LOUISE J. GORDY & ROSCOE N. GRAY, 3 ATTORNEY TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE
§ 60.74 (3d ed. 1990). Thus the production of red blood cells is impaired. The result is
anemia. Anemia resulting from chronic renal failure usually is treated by either dialysis
or androgen, a male hormone. Id. Recombinant EPO does not eliminate the need for
dialysis, but does, however, eliminate the need for blood transfusions, which tend to ex-
pose recipients to various diseases. An 'insulin' for Anemia Sufferers, supra, at 13. Dial-
ysis involves the process of removing waste from the blood by passing blood through a
device, serving essentially as a kidney, and then circulating the blood back into the per-
son. CECIL, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 559-60 (James B. Wyngaarden & Lloyd H. Smith, Jr.
eds., 17th ed. 1985). A transfusion involves transferring the blood from one person to
another. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1474 (24th ed. 1982).
" See generally John Pekkanen, Genetics: Medicine's Amazing Leap, READER'S DI-
GEST, September 1991, at 23-32. "'The genetics revolution will change medicine more in
the next 20 years than it has changed in the past 2000." (quoting Dr. Leroy Hood, one
1992]
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vances in the field of biotechnology have found applications in
treating diseases such as AIDS, diabetes, influenza, and muscu-
lar dystrophy, just to name a few. 17 In addition to the medical
benefits, the technology could be applied to alleviate food
shortages, to clean up hazardous oil spills in the ocean and to
extract scarce minerals from the soil.'"
Second, this is the first case to call for the interpretation of
19 U.S.C. section 1337(a) 19 of the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
of the country's leading geneticists). Id.
The United States Office of Human Genome Research has set it sights on mapping
the position of each of the 50,000 to 100,000 genes contained in the body's 46 chromo-
somes. In brief, the Human Genome Iniatitive is a project to locate and identify all the
genes that make up a human being. The human genome can be found in every cell of
every human. The task will involve sequencing three billion base pairs of nucleotides.
See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Mapping Our Genes; Genome
Projects: How Big, How Fast? (1988). See generally JOEL DAVIS, MAPPING THE CODE: THE
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND THE CHOICES OF MODERN SCIENCE (1990). What is truly
amazing is that scientists do not know the function of 95% of those three billion nucleo-
tides, so scientists often refer to them as "junk." Bernard D. Davis and Colleagues, The
Human Genome and Other Initiatives, SCIENCE, July 27, 1990, at 342. Scientists of the
Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health must grapple not only with
purely scientific issues but with a wide array of practical but complex issues such as:
What is the most ecomonical method for sequencing? What kind of computer systems
must be devised for effectively storing and accessing the data? How much money should
be spent on this project and thereby reduce the amount left for research in other areas in
biotechnology? Id. The magnitude of the undertaking and its significance in the history
of mankind has been compared to nothing less than the Manhattan Project. Paul Kroll,
The Gene Healers, Curing Inherited Diseases, PLAIN TRUTH, Sept. 1990, at 4.
" John Pekkanen, Genetics: Medicine's Amazing Leap, READER'S DIGEST, Septem-
ber 1991, at 23-32; Theodore Friedmann, Progress Toward Human Gene Theraphy, Sci-
ENCE, June 16, 1989, at 1275. See generally Human Gene Therapy-A Background Pa-
per Washington, D.C. U.S. Cong., Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-BP-BA-32
(Dec. 1984).
'8 GERARD J. TORTORA & NICHOLAS P. ANAGNOSTAKOS, PRINCIPLES OF ANATOMY AND
PHYSIOLOGY 40 (5th ed. 1987).
19 The issue in Amgen hinges on the interpretation of section 1337 of the 1930
Trade Act as amended under the 1988 Trade Act. Section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the 1988
Trade Act provides as follows:
(a) Unlawful activities; covered industries; definitions (1) Subject to paragraph
(2), the following are unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist shall
be dealt with, in addition to any other provision of law, as provided in this section:
(B) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale
within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee,
of articles that -
(ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process
covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/14
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tiveness Act of 1988, which reenacted 19 U.S.C. section 1337a.2 °
The major area of dispute in this case was whether section 337
as amended by the 1988 Trade Act was intended to expand the
rights of product patent holders or was merely a reenactment of
section 337 whereby the importation of a product made abroad
by a patented process constitutes unfair competition.2 1 The deci-
sion may serve as a catalyst to spur Congress to amend 35
U.S.C. section 103 and thereby help protect domestic industry
from their indefatigable foreign competitors.
Part I of this article summarizes the facts and holding of
the Amgen decision. Part II analyzes the Amgen and Durden
cases and examines some of the ramifications of the decisions. In
part III this note concludes that the legislative approach is nec-
essary to clarify the law for the benefit of the business commu-
nity and to provide reasonable certainty in this area of process
patents. Part IV presents the potential consequences of legisla-
tive change.
I. AMGEN, INC. V. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
On February 10, 1988, the ITC instituted an investigation
under former section 1337(a)23 pursuant to a complaint filed by
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a) (1983 & Supp. 1991).
20 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, Stat. 1107. 19
U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1989).
' Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1538, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
' The distribution of U.S. patents is noted to be a good indicator of which compa-
nies are instrumental in setting the pace for modern technology. A study of U.S. patents
issued to American and Japanese inventors between 1975 and 1985 revealed that U.S.
patents issued to Japanese inventors doubled from nine to eighteen percent. W. Scouton,
M. Glover, Study Shows That Number of U.S. Patents Issued To Japanese Has Grown
Over Last Decade, BusINEss AMERICA, Sept. 25, 1989, at 13. By way of contrast, the U.S.
share decreased from 65% to 56%. Id. By 1984, the Japanese held more U.S. patents
than British, French and German inventors combined. By 1986, Hitachi had become the
number one recipient of U.S. patents. In 1987, the top three U.S. patent recipients were
Hitachi, Canon, and Toshiba. Id. From 1961 to 1986 General Electric was the number
one recipient of U.S. patents. B. Rudolph, Eyes on the Prize: Japan challenges Ameri-
can's reputation for creativity and innovation, TIME, March 21, 1988, at 50. As of 1987,
it was ranked fourth. Id.
23 The forerunner of section 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act was section 316 of the Tariff
Act of 1922 (the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act). Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 316, 42
Stat. 858, 943-44. In the Tariff Act of 1930, popularly known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act, Congress amended section 316, and designated the amended provision as section
337. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, title III, Part II, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703-04 (codified as
19921
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Amgen on January 4, 1988.24 The complaint alleged that the de-
fendants, Chugia Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Chugia Pharma
U.S.A., Inc., had violated former section 1337(a) by unlawfully
importing into the United States recombinant erythropoietin
(rEPO) manufactured by a process covered by Amgen's '008 pat-
ent. On August 23, 1988, Congress passed the 1988 Trade Act
which substantially amended former section 1337(a).25 The
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337) (1983 & Supp. 1991).
ITC investigations under section 337 have steadily increased from 1974 to 1987 and
the trend is expected to continue. Melise R. Blakeslee, R.V. Lupo & George M. Schwab,
The Int'l Trade Comm'n Section 337 Action: An Improved Weapon For U.S. Industries
In Intellectual Property Battleground, in PATENT LITIGATION 217 (Practising Law Insti-
tute 1989). Section 337 protects intellectual property rights from infringement by im-
ports, by providing a remedy for unfair practices in import trade. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)
(1983 & Supp. 1991). It empowers the ITC to investigate allegations that an accused
patent infringer is importing into the United States a product that violates the intellec-
tual property rights of the patent owner and thereby is engaging in unfair competition.
In the majority of section 337 cases, the unfair act takes the form of patent infringement.
Gary M. Hnath & James M. Gould, Litigating Trade Secret Cases at the International
Trade Commission, 19 AIPLA Q. J. 87, 88 n. 4 (Fall 1991). "Of the 331 cases brought
before the ITC since 1974, 274 have involved allegations of patent infringement." Id. It is
well settled that patent infringement is an unfair method of competition. E.g., Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Former 19 U.S.C. section 1337(a) was enacted in response to the decision by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In Re Amtorg Trading Corporation. 75 F.2d
826 (C.C.P.A. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 476 (1935). The issue in that case was
whether the importation of a product manufactured abroad by a process that was pat-
ented in the United States constituted an unfair trade practice under section 337. The
Court in a prior decision, In Re Northern Pigment Co., 71 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1934), had
held that such importations constitute unfair trade practices. In Amtorg, however, the
Court reversed itself, and held that the importation of a product manufactured abroad
through a patented process did not constitute an unfair practice. Amtorg, 75 F.2d at 834.
The Court reasoned that in enacting section 337 Congress had not sought to expand
substantive patent rights to the point where the conduct complained of constituted un-
fair competition. Since the grant of an exclusive patent is limited to the territory of the
United States, the Court held that use of the patented process abroad did not constitute
infringement. Therefore, the court found that since there was no patent infringement
there could be no unfair competition. Id. at 834.
", Amgen Inc., v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1534, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1734,
1736 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
"6 In response to the Amtorg decision Congress eventually provided legislative relief
in the form of 19 U.S.C. section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. However, in the 1980s,
Congress became dissatisfied with the protection afforded to American intellectual prop-
erty under former section 337, because the necessary showing to prevail under the crite-
ria of section 337 was too high. Act of August 23, 1988, P.L. 100-418, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(1107 Stat.) 1666-67. Moreover, meaningful relief was not available to process patent
owners as they had no right to an infringement action against those who imported into
into the United States products made by the patented process, id. at 2120-22, and had
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/14
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Trade Act specifically stated that it applied to all pending Com-
no right to monetary damages against such importers. Act of August 23, 1988, P.L. 100-
418, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (1107 Stat.) 2120-22; 35 U.S.C. § 287(b). (1981 & Supp. 1991).
Prior to the 1988 changes in the trade law, in order for the ITC to determine that an
unfair act had been committed, the owner of the U.S. patent must first have established
that the act of a foreign competitor threatened to destroy or substantially injure a do-
mestic industry efficiently and economically functioning. Former 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (d), (e)
and (f) (1983). Only if the patent holder made such a showing could the ITC issue a
cease and desist order or an exclusion order. Id.
The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, section 1342 of the 1988 Omni-
bus Trade and Competitiveness Act made, inter alia, four major changes to § 337. One,
it eliminated the economic injury requirement where infringement of a United States
patent or federally registered trademark, copyright or semiconductor mask work is in-
volved. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a)(1)(B) (1983 & Supp. 1991) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 1337a
(1983)).
Two, it expanded the definition of the term domestic industry. For purposes of the
Trade act an industry is defined as one that exists in the United States if there is: (1)
significant investment in plant or equipment; (2) significant employment of labor or cap-
ital; or (3) substantial research and development, or licensing. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a)(3)
(1983 & Supp. 1991) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 1337a (1983)). The criteria of the section are
set forth in terms of the disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunctive "and", which means
that a complainant in a patent based § 337 investigation need only satisfy one of the
three alternatives.
Three, it eliminated the requirement that the domestic industry be "efficiently and
economically operated." 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a)(1)(B) (1983 & Supp. 1991) (amending 35
U.S.C. § 1337a (1983)). Four, the 1988 amendments provide for awards of damages
against process patent infringers. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (b) (1981 & Supp. 1991). However,
section 337 of both the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Trade Act of 1988 permit the ITC to
refrain from issuing a cease and desist order if it believes doing so would be in the public
interest.
The 1988 Trade Act also added a new subsection to 35 U.S.C. section 271, which
provides that the importation into or sale or use within the United States of a product
made by a patented process constitutes infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1981 & Supp.
1991).
In the 1988 Trade Act, the United States acknowledged the serious shortcomings in
its trade policy and the inadequate growth in the productivity and competitiveness of
United States firms in comparison to their overseas competition. Act of August 23, 1988,
P.L. 100-418, § 1001 (a)(3)(G), (H), 1988 USCCAN (1120 Stat.). The Trade Act then
spelled out essential United States objectives. One paramount objective is to guarantee
the continued vitality of the technological and industrial base of the United States. Id. at
§ 1001(a)(4)(A).
The purpose of the amendments to section 337 was to strengthen the protection
given to the intellectual property rights of United States firms. Act of August 23, 1988,
P.C. 100-418, § 1341(b), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (1212 Stat.). For a fuller discussion of the
changes under the 1988 Trade Act with respect to unfair competition, see Terry L. Clark,
A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals For the Federal
Circuit: The Future of Patent Based Investigations Under 337 After Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1149 (1989).
19921
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mission investigations.26 Therefore, the case at bar became gov-
erned by the new Trade Act."
Following institution of the action, the Administrative Law
Judge (A.L.J.) conducted a thorough investigation. 2  The pri-
mary issue disputed between the parties was whether Amgen's
'008 patent covered the process by which Chugia produced
rEPO overseas, within the meaning of section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii),
even though Amgen conceded its patent contained no traditional
process claims.2 The A.L.J. concluded that there was no viola-
tion of section 337 in the importation of rEPO.
The A.L.J. determined that the '008 patent did not cover
the process by which the defendant produced rEPO. Instead, the
A.L.J. determined that the '008 patent covered only a product
(genetically engineered host cells, vectors, and DNA sequences
used to make rEPO) and did not directly, or by implication, pro-
tect a process (growing a transfected host cell and isolating the
protein).30 Hence the claimed process infringement was not suffi-
21 Section 1342 (d) provides that, subject to an exception not material here, "the
amendments made by [§ 1337] shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this
Act." 19 U.S.C. 1342 (d) (1983 & Supp. 1991).
27 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1534, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1736.
28 Administrative Law Judge Sidney Harris issued an extremely comprehensive 188-
page opinion.
" A traditional process claim is one that recites a step-by-step procedure. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 416 F.2d 10 (1969) ("A process
patent is one concerning the mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a certain
result."). Thomson Machinery Co. v. Larose, 197 F.Supp. 636 (E.D.La. 1961), af'd, 320
F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1963) ("A process, or method, patent is one which outlines a procedure
for producing a physical result independent of the producing mechanism" and "a sepa-
rate patent may be obtained on producing mechanism provided it rises to the standard
of invention.").
20 The A.L.J. began his analysis by determining the scope of § 1337(a). He inter-
preted the language of § 1337(a) to mean that the statute is triggered when an imported
product utilizes a patented process to manufacture the product. U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, Initial Determination 15 (Investigation No. 337-TA-281) (Jan. 1989). He was
not persuaded by plaintiff's contention that section 1337(a) prohibits importation of a
product made by a process "covered by" the claims of a patented product. Id. at 13.
The A.L.J. then determined that plaintiff's contention that the claims that it did
receive from the patent examiner covered both a product (the host cells) and the intra-
cellular processes that are inherent in the product (synthesis of rEPO) was without
merit. First, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, the claims examiner denied Amgen claims
to the process for the production of rEPO that comprised the growth of the transfected
host cells and the isolation of the rEPO produced by the host cells. Id. at 23, 24. Second,
after its process patents applications were rejected Amgen amended its application to
describe claims that were directed solely to products, i.e., DNA sequences, DNA vectors,
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/14
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cient grounds for finding a violation under section 337.
On April 10, 1989, after a full review of the Initial Determi-
nation, the Commission entered its final opinion denying Amgen
any relief.3 ' The Commission adopted and relied upon major
portions of the Initial Determination, including the critical find-
ing that Amgen's patent did not cover a process for the manu-
facture of rEPO 2  The Commission, however, dismissed
Amgen's complaint on the grounds of lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction, rather than ruling on the merits of the case. 3 The
Commission reasoned that the plaintiff did not establish a pro-
and transformed and transfected host cells, not to any processes. Id. at 24. Third, Dr.
Lin, the inventor of rEPO, testified that he did not consider the intracellular processes of
the host cell to be part of his invention. Id. at 25.
31 Pursuant to the Commission's order, Amgen's complaint was dismissed and the
investigation was terminated. In the MATTER OF CERTAIN RECOMBINANT ER-
YTHROPOIETIN, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n (Investigation No. 337-TA-281) (1989).
In its opinion, the Commission stated:
The [A.L.J.] determined that the '008 claims do not cover any processes. The
[A.L.J.'s] determination is based on: (1) the cancellation of certain process claims
during prosecution of the '008 patent at the PTO, (2) the inventor's testimony
that he did not invent the intracellular processes, and (3) the inventor's failure to
point out where the claims or the specification indicated that the inventor was
claiming the intracellular processes (citations omitted). We adopt the [A.L.J.'s]
finding that the '008 patent does not claim a process. However, we base our deter-
mination on principles of claim interpretation. (The Commission added in a foot-
note that the inventor's testimony is normally not considered a basis for claim
interpretation.).
In the Matter of CERTAIN RECOMBINANT ERYTHROPOIETIN, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 8 (Investigation No. 337-TA-281) (1989).
13 Four of the six Commissioners concluded that since subsection 337(a)(B)(ii) only
applies when process patent claims exist, and Amgen failed to present a patent claim
that covered a process, the Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at
12 (Investigation No. 337-TA-281) (1989). To the extent the majority concluded that
Amgen was not entitled to relief, the two concurring Commissioners agreed. Id. at 13.
The concurring Commissioners would not have dismissed the case on the grounds of lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In their view the investigation should have been dis-
posed of on the merits. Id. The concurring Commissioners reasoned that since Amgen
alleged a patent that covered a process in its complaint, the Commission not only had
jurisdiction but was statutorily obligated to instigate an investigation. Id. at 16. The
Commission turned to the express language of 19 U.S.C § 1337(b)(1). That section
provides:
The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on com-
plaint under oath or upon its initiative. Upon commencing any such investigation,
the Commission shall publish notice thereof in the Federal Register. The Commis-
sion shall conclude any such investigation, and make its determination under this
section, at the earliest practicable time ....
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (b)(1) (emphasis added by Commissioners).
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cess patent claim and that such a claim is a "condition prece-
dent" for invoking jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C. section
337(a)(1)(B)(ii). On June 9, 1989, Amgen filed a timely appeal in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
3 4
The court based its authority to review the Commissioner's deci-
sion on 1337(c). 5
The court found that the ITC decision here fell into one of
the two categories of final determinations set out in Block v.
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n.a6 Under 19 U.S.C. section 1337(c), as
interpreted in Block, an intrinsic final determination requires a
"final determination decision on the merits, excluding or refus-
ing to exclude articles from 'entry'. 3 7 The other category of de-
terminations are those deemed the equivalent of a final determi-
nation.3a  The court accepted Amgen's argument that the
Commission's order was the equivalent of a final determination
" Brief for Amgen Inc. at 4, Amgen Inc. v. Intern. Trade Commission, 902 F.2d
1532 (1990)(No. 89-1523).
'" Amgen Inc. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n., 902 F.2d 1532, 1535, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
1734, 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
'a 777 F.2d 1568, 228 U.S.P.Q. 37 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Block case involved an ap-
peal of the United States International Trade Commission decision to terminate its self-
initiated investigation and to vacate the initial determination of the A.L.J. Id at 1569,
228 U.S.P.Q. at 37. The article under investigation was a flow injection apparatus. Id.
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDAS) owned United States Patent No.
4,013,413. Id. The patented article was a device which analyzed the composition of vari-
ous liquids. Id. at 1570, 228 U.S.P.Q. at 37. Bifok AB, the manufacturer, and five other
corporations involved in the development and importation of the apparatus were named
as respondents. Id. at 1570 n.3, 228 U.S.P.Q. at 37 n.3. The Secretary of Agriculture
appealed the ITC's decision to terminate its investigation. Id. at 1569, 228 U.S.P.Q. at
37.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the ITC decision to termi-
nate was not a final determination and therefore was not appealable. Id. at 1572, 228
U.S.P.Q. at 38-39. The court reasoned that the ITC did not reach a final determination
within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) because to terminate the investigation was not
a decision to exclude nor a decision to refuse to exclude the articles from entry. Id. at
1571, 228 U.S.P.Q. at 39. The court came to the conclusion that the ITC decision was
neither intrinsically a final determination nor its equivalent because the Secretary of
Agriculture was free to request a second investigation under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) and
because the ITC decison was not a final judgment for the purposes of claim or issue
preclusion. Id. at 1571-72, 228 U.S.P.Q. at 39.
11 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1535, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1737 (quoting Block, 777 F.2d at 1571,
228 U.S.P.Q. at 38).
" See Block, 777 F.2d at 1571 n.5, 228 U.S.P.Q. at 38 n.5. See also Import Motors




because, unlike in Block, the Commission made a finding as to
whether 19 U.S.C. section 1337 was violated.-9 In addition, the
dismissal of Amgen's complaint on jurisdictional grounds works
only to prejudice Amgen in any future proceeding.4 0 Finally, the
court found that in cases where a statute sets forth the bases for
federal jurisdiction and prevailing on the merits within the same
statutory language, a court should generally dismiss the com-
plaint on the merits.4 '
The Amgen court went on to discuss the substantive issue
in the case: whether Chugia violated section 1337 by importing a
product made abroad by a process which involved the use of a
product patented in the United States.42 The court first had to
decide whether Amgen's host cell product claims should be ac-
corded the same treatment under section 1337 as any other
claims to a patented product. ' The court found that there was
no difference between Amgen's host cell claims and any other
product claim. The court reasoned that a host cell is much like a
machine."" When one patents a machine, one only has a patent
to the machine itself and not to the processes that take place
inside the machine. "5 Hence, Amgen had a patent that covered
the host cell itself and not the processes that take place inside
that host cell.'
The court then reached the question "whether section
1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) was intended to prohibit the importation of ar-
ticles made abroad by a process in which a product claimed in a
U.S. patent is used, namely the new host cell."4 After determin-
'9 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1535-37, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1737-39. When explaining the
Block case, the court in Amgen stated, "[in concluding that the Order was not an intrin-
sically final determination, this court found the lack of any findings by the Commission
to be critical; nothing in the termination Order prejudiced the Commission or any pri-
vate party in a future proceeding." Id. at 1535, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1737 (citations omitted).
40 If Amgen attempted to bring a new action on the claims of the '008 patent, the
finding of the Commission that there was no patent infingement would presumably bar
Amgen from relitigating the issue under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Id. at 1535-
36, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1737.
4, Id. at 1535, 1537, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1737, 1738-39.
4, Id. at 1538, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
" Id. at 1537, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
44 Id. at 1537-38, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1538, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
1992)
13
PACE YB. INT'L L.
ing the plain meaning of the word "cover" and reviewing the leg-
islative history of former section 1337a, the court determined
that it was intended to prohibit the importation of articles made
using patented processes, and not to prohibit importation of ar-
ticles made by a process using patented products.4 '8 The court
then concluded that the 1988 Trade Act merely re-enacted for-
mer section 1337a and was not intended to change the scope of
the section.49
II. THE IMPACT UPON THE AMERICAN BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
A. Troublesome Problems Raised by Amgen
The Amgen decision brings to light three problems in the
present patent laws. First, the law is unfair to Amgen. The effect
of the court's decision is that since Amgen did not have a pro-
cess patent, Chugia could freely use Amgen's patented articles to
manufacture products that could later be imported into the
United States. The inequity of the decision is highlighted by the
fact that the exact same conduct Chugia is engaging in abroad
would be prohibited if it were done in the United States.5 0 The
court's decision renders Amgen's patent virtually meaningless
with respect to foreign corporations.
The absence of any real protection is made clear when one
examines both-the articles Amgen patented and the acts a for-
eign corporation is prohibited from engaging in. Chugia used
(and is presumably still using) Amgen's patented DNA se-
quence, vectors and host cells to manufacture rEPO abroad.'
There is no known way to manufacture rEPO except by using
Amgen's patented articles.52 The research Dr. Lin performed for
Amgen was undertaken for the purpose of discovering how to
replicate the gene for erythropoietin in order to produce large
amounts of rEPO.5 8 Chugia can manufacture rEPO abroad via a
process utilizing Amgen's patented articles and then import the
48 Id. at 1538-39, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739-41.
" Id. at 1539-40, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1740-41.
60 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Initial Determination 2 (Investigation No. 337-TA-281)
(Jan. 1989).
' Id. at 174-75.
52 Id.
51 Id. at 134-36.
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rEPO into the United States. It merely cannot perform the pro-
duction in the United States.5 4 Any foreign corporation, based
on this decision, can utilize Amgen's patented articles in the
process of manufacturing rEPO abroad and then export the
rEPO to the United States.
The problem is that in a global economy, this gap in the
patent law undermines the very purpose of the American patent
system. The patent system is a mechanism for providing inven-
tors incentive to create new products and perhaps whole new in-
dustries. The patent grants the inventor the exclusive right to
profit from his or her labor. Hence, the patent functions like a
reward. 5
If Chugia, in collaboration with the Genetics Institute, pro-
duces and markets the rEPO as it intended to, it may result in
millions of dollars in lost profits for Amgen." In a field such as
biotechnology millions may be spent on research and develop-
ment before any profitable products may be discovered. 7 When
a corporation finally does develop some product which appears
4 Id. at 2.
55 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974), noting that
patent laws offer a right of exclusion to inventors as an incentive to undertake risks and
costs associated with research and development. In addition to encouraging invention,
the patent system functions to encourage investment and to encourage disclosure. Gerald
Sobel, Antitrust & Technology, in PATENT LITIGATION 194 (Practising Law Institute
1982). Some commentators, however, have identified more complex economic functions
of the patent system. The most frequently cited work in this area is Kitch, The Nature
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1977).
66 Two significant facts indicate that the Amgen Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902
F.2d 1532, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1734 (Fed. Cir. 1990) decision may have a material adverse
effect on the financial position of the company. First, Amgen Inc. engaged in a fierce
legal battle fought from the ITC to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to pro-
tect its invention. The corporation would not have undertaken such an expensive legal
endeavor, if the rEPO patent was not critical to the company's financial interest. Second,
subsequent to the Amgen Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1734
(Fed. Cir. 1990) decision the corporation engaged in lobbying efforts to change the cur-
rent law, such that it will be more favorable to American companies in need of process
patent protection.
57 Amgen's product Epogen (recombinant erythropoietin) represented the result of
more than five years of research. AMGEN INC., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (1991). Amgen's
product neupogen was the result of over six years of research. Id. at 5. The average cost
to develop a pharmacutical product is approximately $230 million. Bruce N. Kuhlik &
Richard F. Kingham, The Adverse Effects of Standardless Punitive Damage Awards on
Pharmaceutical Development and Availability, 45 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 693, 695
(1990).
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to be promising its efforts seem wasted when others are given
the opportunity to capitalize on its discovery.
The court does not explicitly acknowledge that its decision
may not be fair to Amgen." But it does tacitly acknowledge that
Amgen may well be left in an untenuous position. Yet, the court
concludes the deficiency in the trade laws cannot serve as a basis
for the court to abdicate its judicial function of statutory inter-
pretation and resort to legislation by judicial decree.59 Thus, the
court suggests that it is Congress' responsibility to address this
problem in the trade and patent laws."
Some may contend that it is not unfair to require the U.S.
patentee to secure a patent in various foreign countries to pro-
tect its invention from exploitation by foreigners. However, it is
difficult to comprehend why a U.S. patentee should be com-
pelled to secure a patent overseas to prevent the exploitation of
its invention on U.S. soil.
Second, apart from the fact that the Amgen decision is not
fair to the Amgen corporation itself, the consequences of the de-
cision on American industry as a whole are equally unattractive.
The Amgen decision provides an incentive to foreign corpora-
tions to pirate American discoveries any time a new invention is
made in any field, whether it be biotechnology or some other
area where a patentable starting material is used in a known
process to make an unpatentable end product. 1 The foreign cor-
poration need only decide whether the American discovery ap-
pears sufficiently profitable to warrant investment. Once the
technology as to how to produce the product is obtained from
America, the foreign corporation can either enter a joint venture
with an American corporation, set up a subsidiary in America or
merely locate an American distributor. After the manufacturing
abroad is completed, the American corporation or the subsidiary
" Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1540, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741.
19 The decision is a logical application of § 337. But the reason § 337 is inapplicable
stems from the interpretation of In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406, 226 U.S.P.Q. 359 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). This point is explored further infra.
0 Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1540, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741.
01 Although the media often focuses on the trade friction between the United States
and Japan, the United States experiences trade friction with its other trading partners as
well, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. See Edson W. Spencer, Japan:




can then import and market the product in the United States.
The third objection is the unfairness to society. Due to the
absence of patent protection, foreign competition is permitted to
exploit an American invention. Thus, t6 the extent foreign com-
petition sells the final product, an American firm loses sales.
Thus, the American firm has less capital available for research
and development. In turn, less jobs are created for American cit-
izens. Moreover, some American scientists may choose to forgo a
certain area of enterprise because of their awareness of the ab-
sence of patent protection, and technological developments will
evolve at a slower rate. Over time, society's standard of living
may suffer. The fate of Amgen Inc., by itself, may have no sig-
nificant impact on society. Yet, the risk that there will be future
cases similar to Amgen raises the specter that the cumulative
effect on American society may be significant.6 2
B. The Durden Quagmire
The underlying problem with the Amgen decision, which is
not discussed in the Court of Appeals opinion, hinges on In re
Durden.3 In Durden, the court held that a conventional process
is not patentable, even though both the starting material and
the end product may be novel." The court reasoned that the
process would have been obvious to persons of ordinary skill in
the art within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. section 103.65
When the biotechnology industry steps into the Durden
quagmire the surface yields and the industry is then drawn
down into it. This is so because there are only a few biotechno-
logical processes that industry uses, all of which are well
known. Moreover, where the final product is not patentable be-
.. Experts estimate that total domestic and export sales lost from counterfeiting
(trademark copying) and piracy (patant and copyright infringement) in 1984 were as
high as 20 billion. 133 CONG. REC. E984 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep.
Hou).
63 763 F.2d 1406, 226 U.S.P.Q. 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The issue on appeal in that case
involved the patentability of a process of making a novel insecticide.
6 Id. at 1408-09, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 362.
65 Id. at 1408, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 362.
86 Kevin Kelly, Comment, The Elimination of Process: Will The Biotechnology




PACE YB. INT'L L.
cause it is a product found in nature,6 7 as in Amgen, the pa-
tantee is left to patent only the starting material. Yet as dis-
cussed, with this limited patent protection, the patantee has no
remedy against the foreign competitor.
The Durden decision reversed Board of Appeals decisions
Ex parte MacAdams68 and Ex parte Klioze6 9 Ex parte MacAd-
ams held that it is not proper to determine the patentability of a
process solely on the lack of novelty of the physical manipulative
steps.70 According to that court, the method employing the novel
starting material, when viewed as a whole, must be considered
nonobvious, because the starting material was unknown to the
art before the applicant invented it.71 Before that time, no one
skilled in the art would have thought to use it in the conven-
tional process.
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has interpreted
the In re Durden decision as a rejection of the MacAdams ap-
proach and applied it to deny Amgen process patents on the
ground of obviousness. While the Durden court did not clearly
define what is obvious, the PTO examiner used Durden to find
that it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill
in the scientific field of genetic engineering to employ the proce-
dure Amgen used to clone erythropoietin. As indicated earlier, in
a simplified version, the isolated erythropoietin gene is inserted
into a vector, in this case a plasmid, to recombine the DNA se-
quence of EPO with the DNA present in the host cell. In brief,
the process claims sought by Amgen were for the application of
an old process to new materials.72
The application of the In re Durden case led the PTO to
deny Amgen's patent of the process to manufacture rEPO. The
denial of the process patent left Amgen with no claims defining
a process. The Tariff Act of 1930, section 337, as amended, 19
11 Products of nature are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and
102. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
8 206 U.S.P.Q. 445 (1978)
" 220 U.S.P.Q. 91 (1983). The Durden court reversed these two decisions in a foot-
note. In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406, 1409, n.2, 226 U.S.P.Q. 359, 359-60, n.2 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
70 Ex Parte MacAdams, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 447.
71 Id. at 447-48.





U.S.C. section 1337(a), only applies to process patents.73 Al-
though Chugai used patented products in the process of manu-
facturing rEPO, section 1337(a) has no application, and there-
fore Chugai did not violate section 1337(a).
The reasoning in Durden is contrary to that of the decision
in In re Mancy',7 which is not mentioned in the Durden case.
Mancy dealt with the patentability of the process of producing
the antibiotic danunorubicin. 75 The starting material, the micro-
organism streptomyces bifurcus, strain DS 23, 219, was novel.
The final product, the antibiotic, was not novel. The process of
producing the antibiotic by aerobically cultivating the microor-
ganism was well known to the prior art.
76
The court reasoned that in determining obviousness under
103, the inquiry is "whether in view of the prior art the inven-
tion as a whole would have been obvious at the time it was
made. ' ' 77 The process of producing the antibiotic, when viewed
as a whole, included the use of a novel microorganism, and one
having no knowledge of that starting material would not find it
obvious to produce the final product using the new starting ma-
terial.78 Thus, the claimed process was patentable.79
Although the Durden court stated that it agreed with the
proposition that an invention should be viewed as a whole when
determining obviousness, its actions indicated its understanding
of that approach was different from that of the Mancy court.
The underlying premise in Durden relies on either one of two
bases. One, given the identity of the final product, using the new
starting material for the process would be obvious, 80 or two,
given the similarity between the new starting material and those
that are well known in the art, one skilled in the art would apply
the new starting material to the old process. The fallacy in the
first premise is that the final product did not exist before the
" Amgen Inc. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1539-40, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
1734, 1740-41 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
" 499 F.2d 1289, 182 U.S.P.Q. 303 (1974).
" Id. at 1290, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 304.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 1292, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 305.
78 Id. at 1292-94, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 305-06.
" Id. at 1294, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 306.
8o THE BNA SPECIAL REPORT SERIES ON BIOTECHNOLOGY, BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS: A
BUSINESS MANAGER'S LEGAL GUIDE 32 (1989).
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new set of ingredients were combined to produce the final prod-
uct. Thus, regardless of whether the final product itself is novel
and patentable, its identity was unknown to the prior art. Simi-
larly, the fallacy in the second, alternative, premise is that one
skilled in the art could not choose to use the new starting mate-
rial in lieu of what was used in the past, because "one cannot
choose from the unknown.""
Commentators have decried the Durden decision because of
the gaping hole it left in the armor of those who would seek pat-
ent protection.2 They have suggested that there should be some
legislation, i.e., either by amendment of the patent laws or by
special legislation granting some new form of protection to the
biotechnology companies. Alternatively, they have suggested
that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circit clarify the re-
quirements for patentability under section 103 with respect to
biotechnological processes.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
A. Pending Legislation
Regardless of what may be said of the relative unfairness of
the Amgen decision, the court took the wisest approach. The va-
lidity of the Durden decision was not an issue before the court.
Moreover, if the court found that the ITC had jurisdiction to
prohibit importation of Chugai's products, it would have been
forced to conclude that Congress sought to make a major inno-
vation in United States trade laws by reenacting section
1337(a).13
81 In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289, 1293, 182 U.S.P.Q. 303, 306 (1974).
82 BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, S. REP. No. 102-260, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1991); Rochelle K. Seide & Aimee H. Weiss, The Biotechnology Patent
Protection Act of 1991: The Battle Lines Have Been Drawn, J. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 6
(Mar. 1992); Harold C. Wegner, Biotechnology Process Patents: Judicial or Legislative
Remedy, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 24 (1991); Harold C. Wegner, Much Ado
About Durden, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 785 (1989); David Beier & Robert H.
Benson, Biotechnology Patent Prtection Act, 68 U. DENVER L. REV. 173 (1991); Louis S.
Sorell & Susan K. Lehnhardt, Current State of Law Regarding Biotechnology Process
Patents (1991) (unpublished, on file with author); Kevin Kelly, Comment, The Elimina-
tion of Process: Will the Biotechnology Patent Protection Act Revive Process Patents,
24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 263 (1990). For a comprehensive discussion of the Durden case
and other major patent issues in biotechnogy, see BNA GUIDE, supra note 80.
83 Congress is presumed to be aware of a judicial interpretation of a statute and to
[Vol. 4:387406.
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The primary reason for the court's reluctance to read sec-
tion 1337(a) broadly is the court's implicit asseveration that the
international arena is not the canvass for the court to paint with
a broad brush.8' A court simply lacks the expertise and tools to
frame an opinion that could take into account the far-reaching
implications of a holding that extends patent protection signifi-
cantly beyond the areas that Congress had envisioned.8 5 The
democratic process accords the legislature the province of bal-
ancing competing interests with regard to high policy matters.
Against this backround, the plain meaning approach
adopted by the court carried out the legislature's intent.8 " While
it may at first blush appear unfair to allow Chugai or any other
foreign industry to reap the rewards of Dr. Lin's invention with-
out Amgen's authorization, fairness, like beauty, is in the eyes of
the beholder.
The United States' definition of fairness may not square
fully with that of its trading partners.8 7 The question of fairness
essentially boils down to basic assumptions about what is valua-
adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change. See Albemarle Pa-
per Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n. 8 (1975); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co. v. United
States, 252 U.S. 140, 147 (1920). The answer to whether section 1337(a) was intended to
prohibit the importation of goods made by a process which used a product patented in
the United States was not clear, because this was a case of first impression. Amgen, 902
F.2d at 1540, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1541. There was no long-established and familiar inter-
pretation of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended § 1337a, as recodified § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii),
upon which the court could rely.
84 See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). If the court held in favor of Amgen, the
decision would face a backlash of arguments both at home and abroad. Apart from argu-
ments as to its consistency with prior case law, opposition to such a holding would argue
that the decision might severely undermine the credibility of the United States in ongo-
ing multilateral trade negotiations, and thus pose a serious threat to the potential suc-
cess of the negotiations. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., (BNA) 3 (September 26, 1990).
See infra notes 177-217 and accompanying text for a discussion of the arguments oppos-
ing the bill, which would provide for the kind of patent protection Amgen Inc. urged the
court to find in the language of 1337(a).
" The judiciary "must proceed cautiously when . . . asked to extend patents rights
into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress." Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978).
88 Amgen Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
87 For a full discussion of United States laws concerned with unfair trade, see gener-
ally, Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A Competitive Based Approach, 41 STAN
L. REV. 1153 (1989). For a general critique of the United States conception of free trade,
see John M. Culberston, A Realist View of International Trade and National Trade
Policy, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1119 (1986).
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ble in life: assumptions about what is good, true, desirable and
useful.88 The architects of virtually any statute must perforce
make a policy decision as to what is fair."
The confusion surrounding the Durden case makes legisla-
tion imperative. "The PTO has. . . applied Durden regularly to
claims to processes of making and processes of using, on the
" The United States and Japan do not labor under the same assumptions. RICHARD
T. PASCALE & ANTHONY G. ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT 128, 135-160
(1981). With regard to the economy, the United States operates under principles based
on the writings of Adam Smith, where the invisible hand of the free market satisfies
consumer needs and the economy functions most efficiently with minimal government
intervention. C. PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES, How WE ARE GIVING OUR FUTURE To
JAPAN AND How To RECLAIM IT 115, 254 (1989). Companies should function like lone
cowboys. Id. at 103-04. If they cannot make their way to success and happen to falter, let
them die. Id.
Yet, the Japanese do not operate according to the rules and assumptions of Western
values. Government, management and labor form a cohesive unit. The three work in
concert to reach a national goal-domination of a particular industry. Id. at 129-30, 193.
The Japanese operate, at least in part, under principles based on the writings of Joseph
Schumpter, an Austria economist. Id. at 254. Government intervention to spur economic
development is viewed as not only desirable but in fact necessary to achieve national
objectives. Id. at 233, 253, 256. Government intervention involves an array of activity to
reduce the risk of loss to industry. Id. at 135. These activities involve more than just
subsidies and tax incentives. The government provides financial support for research and
development, encourages private lenders to make low interest loans, impedes the efforts
of foreigners to enforce patent infringement claims and encourages the growth of cartels.
Id. at 222, 229, 259-60, 264, 273.
Perhaps the quintessential example of how the United States and Japan differ on
what is fair and unfair is the Japanese encroachment strategy of the United States semi-
conductor industry. Id. at 120-178. By selling the chips below cost, the Japanese dump-
ing during 1985-86 drove five American D-RAM manufactures out of business and ena-
bled Japan to capture 90% of the world D-RAM market. See George Gilder, How the
computer companies lost their memories, FORBES, June 13, 1988, at 79-84; George Gilder
et al, Who caused the D-RAM crisis?, FORBES, July 25, 1988, at 70-71. D-RAMs (Dy-
namic Random Access Memory) are memory chips found in all computers. George
Gilder, How the computer companies lost their memories, FORBES, June 13, 1988, at 79.
For a discussion of the subject, see David Hirsch, International Trade-Arrangement Be-
tween the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States Concerning
Trade in Semiconductor Products 28-29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 175 (1987-88). The Japanese
did not consider dumping unfair, but rather just an intelligent means by which to cap-
ture a desired market share. C. PRESTOWITZ, JR., supra, at 137, 147. From Japan's point
of view, it plays fair; America simply does not work hard enough. Id.
89 Hon. Carlos J. Moorhead of California, in his closing remarks 'in regards to the
introduction of The Patent Protection Act, stated "[flundamental fairness requires as
much and so does our obligation to innovative American companies, American workers,
and all the many people who will enjoy the benefits of Biotechnology products." 136
CONG. REc. E207 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
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ground that ... the claimed process is not novel."' 0 Thus, how-
ever narrow the Durden court may have viewed its holding, e1 the
PTO does not view it as having limited application. The Ameri-
can government has an interest in furthering the primary objec-
tive of the patent system, which is to promote the development
of science by offering an incentive to pursue research, 2 and in
ensuring that American companies remain competitive. Legisla-
tion would be the most effective way to attain these goals.
Moreover, a legislative change in the laws would promote
uniformity in the application of the patent laws. Process patent
protection, ultimately based on the subjective eye of the review-
ing court, only serves to create disarray amoung the courts.
Since commercial enterprises place a premium on certainty, that
disarray is likely to have a disruptive effect on those enterprises.
If Congress grants additional process patent protection by stat-
ute, there will be more stability and predictability in the admin-
istration of the patent laws. A clear law creates settled expecta-
tions that allow businesses to structure their conduct with some
minimum assurrance as to what the potential benefits or draw-
backs of that conduct will be.
On February 6, 1990 the Biotechnology Patent Protection
Act (the Act) of 1990 was introduced.'3 With an eye towards
fairness, Congress, by proposing such a bill, sought to create a
"level playing field."' 4 The bills, H.R. 3957 and S. 2326,'1 were
designed to correct the problem created by the Durden decision.
The bills would amend 35 U.S.C. section 103, making a process
which involves known techniques nonobvious if novel starting
material is used.
The two bills each had three sections and were identical
apart from their effective dates. Section 1 provided that a pro-
cess which involves known manipulations or methods to make a
In re Dillion, 919 F.2d 688, 695, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1897, 1903 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
,' The court stated that it is "to decide each case on the basis of its own particular
fact situation." In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406, 1410, 226 U.S.P.Q. 359, 361 (1985).
92 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 480-481 (1974); Universal Oil Co. v.
Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
90 H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
136 CONG. REc. E207 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
" The senate bill S. 2326, an identical version of H.R. 3957, was introduced on
March 22, 1990. S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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product will be considered patentable, if the starting material is
novel. 6 Section 2(a) provided that the jurisdiction of the United
States International Trade Commission (ITC) would be ex-
panded to cover imports made from patentable starting materi-
als," and that the ITC would have the power to exclude such
articles."" Section 2(b) provided that patent infringement actions
against importation of products convered under the bill may be
brought in district court.99 The Bill would permit an American
firm holding a patent to freely license the biologicial starting
material to foreign industry if it so elected. 100 Section 3 provided
that the Act would apply to all patents granted both before and
after the effective date of the Act.10
On September 18, 1990 a revised version of the bill was pro-
posed.1 02 Although the basic purpose of the bill remained un-
changed, the language of the revised version of the legislation,
91 136 CONG. REC. E213-14 (Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Boucher). H.R. 3957
and S. 2326 provide, in pertinent part:
SECTION 1. PATENTABILITY OF CERTAIN PROCESSES.
Section 103 of title 35, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following new paragragh:
'A process of making a product shall not be considered obvious under this
section if an essential material used in the process is novel under section 102 and
otherwise nonobvious under section 103.'
'" Section 2(a) of H.R. 3957 and S. 2326 would amend § 337(a)(1)(B) of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337(a)(1)(B)) by adding the following (new language in italics):
(B) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale
within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee,
of articles that . . . are made, produced, or processed under, or by means of, the
use of an essential biotechnological material (as defined under section 154(b) of
title 35, United States Code) covered by a valid and enforceable United States
patent.
S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1990); H.R. 3957, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1990).
136 CONG. REc. E214 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
9 Under H.R. 3957 and S. 2326 title 35 U.S.C. § 271 would be amended as follows:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or sells or uses within
the United States a product which is made by using a biotechnological material
(as defined under section 154(b)) which is patented in the United States shall be
liable as an infringer if the importation, sale, or use of the product occurs during
the term of such patent.
S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (1990); H.R. 3957, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. § 2(b)
(1990).
100 136 CONG. REC. E214 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1990); H.R. 3957, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. § 3
(1990); 136 CONG. REC. E207 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
102 H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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H.R. 5664, was substantially rewritten.103 In addition, H.R. 5664
eliminated certain provisions found in H.R. 3957 and S. 2326.
Section 2(a) of the original version of the bill regarding the ex-
tension of ITC jurisdiction was dropped, because the legislature
agreed that the language was unnecessary.0 4 The ITC already
has jurisdiction over suits relating to unfair practices in import
trade under 19 U.S.C. 1337(a). Section 2(b) of the original ver-
sion was also deemed unnecessary, because Federal district
courts already have original jurisdiction over patent infringe-
ment actions under section 1338(a).105 The bills would apply to
patents granted on or after the date of enactment, and to patent
applications pending or filed on or after the date of enact-
ment. '06 The much criticized provision regarding retroactive ap-
plication of the Act was eliminated.
On March 13, 1991 H.R. 1417 and S. 654, entitled the Bio-
technology Patent Protection Act of 1991, were introduced.0 '
The language of the bills was identical to the language found in
H.R. 5664. During mark up, the Senate Subcommitte on Pat-
ents, Copyrights and Trademarks redrafted the bill and on July
25, 1991 approved the amended version of S. 654.' 08 Under the
03 Under H.R. 5664, § 103 of title 35 was to be amended as follows:
When a process of making or using a machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter is sought to be patented the same application as such machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, such process shall not be considered as obvious
under this section if such machine, manufacture, or composition of matter is novel
under section 102 and nonobvious under this section. If the patentability of such
process depends upon such machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, then
a single patent shall issue on the application.
H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
104 Telephone Interview with Mr. Vanhorn, Director of Biotechnology and former
Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (July 16, 1991). See
also PAT. & TRADEMARK DAILY 2 (BNA)(Sept. 26, 1990). In addition, any provision pro-
viding for the expansion of ITC jurisdiction was eliminated because foreign countries
have argued that § 1337(a) unfairly discriminates against foreign companies. Rochelle K.
Seide & Aimee H. Weiss, The Biotechnology Patent Protection Act of 1991: The Battle
Lines Have Been Drawn, J. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 9 (Mar. 1992)
10' Telephone Interview with Mr. Vanhorn, Director of Biotechnology and former
Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (July 16, 1991).
,o H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1990).
107 S. 654, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1417, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
100 42 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 313 (August 1, 1991). Although all of
the bills were drafted with the biotechnology industry in mind, the proposed changes in
the patent laws should not be limited solely to the biotechnology industry. S. 654 as
amended, unlike any of the prior bills, except for H.R. 5664, is not entitled the Biotech-
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revised S. 654 both sections 103 and 282 of title 35 U.S.C. are to
be amended." 9 On Novemeber 21, 1991 S. 654, as amended, was
passed by the Judiciary Committee.
The redrafted bill incorporated the Bush Administration's
concern that process patents granted under the proposed
amendment expire on the same date as the product patents
which formed the basis of the process claims. °10 Of course appli-
cants are free to seek a patent on a process under current law.
Hence, the applicant may demonstrate that the patentability of
the process is not dependent on the patentability of a particular
nology Patent Protection Act. There is no suggestion in the revised S. 654 that it should
be limited to biological discoveries. Moreover, since the Durden decision can, in princi-
ple, apply to other industries apart from the biotechnology field, the impact of that deci-
sion poses a threat to the vitality of other American industries as well. All American
industries deserve protection from unfair foreign competition. For these reasons the bill
should not be construed as industry specific.
'o9 Under § 1 of S.654, § 103 of title 35, U.S.C., is to be amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new subsection:
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a claimed process of mak-
ing or using a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter is not obvious
under this section if-
(1) the machine, manufacture, or composition of matter is novel under section
102 of this title and nonobvious under this section; and
(2)(A) the machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, and the claimed
process invention at the time it was made, were owned by the same person or
subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person; and
(B) claims to the process and to the machine, manufacture, or composition or
matter, are entitled to the same effective filing date, and appear in the same pat-
ent or in different patents which are owned by the same person and are set to
expire on the same date.
S.654, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Under § 2 of the bill entitled "Presumption of Validity" § 282 of title 35 is amended
by inserting after the second sentence:
A claim issued under the provisions of section 103(c) of this title on a process of
making or using a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter shall not be
held invalid under section 103 of this title solely because the machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter is determined to lack novelty under section 102 of
this title or to be obvious under section 103 of this title.
Id.
Section 3 of the bill entitled "Effective Date" provides as follows:
The amendments made by this Act shall apply to all United States patents
granted on or after the date of the enactment of this Act and to all applications
for United States patents pending on or filed after such date of enactment, includ-
ing any application for the reissuance of a patent.
Id.
11 BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, S. REP. No. 102-260, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 14 (1991)
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product.111 In which case, a process patent, independently pat-
entable, need not expire on the same day as the product patent.
B. Arguments Against The Proposed Legislation
Opponents of the proposed legislation advance one major
argument against adoption of such legislation." 2 It is argued
Id.
"I Some opponents of the bill have suggested that the proposed legislation would
encourage overclaiming, which is impermissible under the doctrine of Lincoln Engineer-
ing Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545 (1938). 40 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. (BNA) 462 (Sept. 27, 1990). However, Lincoln Engineering has very limited, if any,
precedential value today.
In Lincoln Engineering a plaintiff brought a suit for contributory infringement
against a supplier of fittings for lubrication guns. Lincoln Engineering Co., 303 U.S. at
547. The fittings, which were well known to the art, were included in plaintiff's combina-
tion patent. Id. at 546. Save the patentable improvement in the "chuck" or coupler, the
other elements of plaintiff's combination patent - a lubrication gun and hose - were
also known to the art. Id. at 549, 551.
The Court held that the plaintiff's patent was void because it claimed more than the
plaintiff invented. Id. The court added that "the improvement of one part of an old
combination gives no right to claim that improvement in combination with other old
parts which perform no new function in the combination." Id. at 549-50. The principle
applies not only in cases of contributory infringement but also in cases where it is alleged
that defendant is infringing upon the improved element of the combination. Great A. &
P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 150 (1950).
The policy underlying the Court's decision in Lincoln Engineering stems from the
1822 Supreme Court decision Evans v. Eaton. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822); Holstensson
v. V-M Corporation, 325 F.2d 109, 125 (1963). In Evans the court invalidated a patent to
a "Hopper Boy," a machine used in the manufacturing of flour, because the patent com-
prehended the whole machine and was thus broader than the invention. Id. at (7 Wheat.)
428-31.
After reviewing the requirements of the then existing patent law, the Court rea-
soned: "the party cannot entitle himself to a patent for more than his own invention;
...the patent should be limited to such improvement, for if it includes the whole ma-
chinery, it includes more than his invention and therefore cannot be supported." Id. at
430-31 (7 Wheat at 430-31).
From Lincoln Engineering and its progeny grew the principle that for a combination
of old and new elements to be patentable the old elements in conjunction with the new
element must perform some new function and thus add to the utility and novelty of the
product to justify patentability for the total combination. Ansul Company v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 301 F.Supp. 273, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing Great A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950); see also Holstensson v. V-M Corporation, 325 F.2d 109,
120 (6th Cir. 1963) (citing Lincoln Enginering; DeBurgh v. Kindel Furniture Co., D.C.,
125 F. Supp. 468, 476 (W.D.Mich. 1954), aff'd, 229 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1956)). "[O]nly
when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old
devices patentable." Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152
(1950). In addition, the combination of the old elements must not have been obvious to
those skilled in the art prior to the date of the invention. Ansul Company v. Uniroyal,
1992]
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that the legislation is unnecessary because the Federal Circuit
decision in In re Pleuddeman"3 clarified the confusion sur-
rounding the Durden decision.
1 4
Inc., 301 F.Supp. 273, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Yet even from its genisis the doctrine of Lincoln Engineering has been criticized.
The dissenter in Evans rejected the majority's holding as unfair because the penalty of
total forfeiture of a patent was viewed as too harsh a rule. 20 U.S (7 Wheat) 448.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 163
U.S.P.Q. 611 (1969), in a well reasoned opinion reversed a patent examiner's decision to
deny a combination patent, on the ground that Lincoln Engineering should not be fol-
lowed. Id. at 1402. The court pointed out that the effect of an inventor claiming old
elements in combination with an improved element creates a lesser monopoly than if the
inventor patented the improved element alone. Id. Implicitly, the court reasoned that an
inventor has a lesser monopoly because the patent is only infringed when another seeks
to use the whole product, the new element in combination with the old. If someone
found another use for the new element separate from its use in combination with the old
elements, the combination patent would not be infringed.
Similarly, the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals in Ex Parte Barber,
187 U.S.P.Q. 244 (1974), also declined to follow Lincoln Engineering. Id. at 246. There
the court held that the examiner erroneously denied patent protection to an improved
muffler claimed in combination with old elements forming an internal combustion en-
gine. Id. at 244-45. The court reasoned that because 35 U.S.C. section 271(c) provides
that it is a defense to contributory infringement that a product is capable of substantial
non-infringing use, the rationale of Lincoln Engineering has been eliminated by the leg-
islature and therefore is no longer good law. Id. at 246.
While the issue of whether Lincoln Engineering is still a viable doctrine is not to-
tally free from doubt, it would be fair to say that beyond providing an incentive to com-
ply with 35 U.S.C. § 112, Lincoln Engineering is no longer good law today. Radio Steel &
MFG. Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 731 F.2d 840, 845, 221 U.S.P.Q. 657 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(the doctrine is no longer good law beyond the requirement that a patent directed to a
combination of old elements must comply with § 112); Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus-
trial Products, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 641, 647 (1978) (court declined to reach issue whether
Lincoln Engineering is still valid). But see Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444
F.Supp. 648, 717-18 (1977) (Lincoln Engineering continues to remain good law and pat-
ent was declared invalid on ground it is directed to old combination with only one new
element).
-,- 910 F.2d 823, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1738 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
1'4 42 PAT. TRADEMARK & COYRIGHT J. (BNA) 184, 187 (June 20, 1991).
The statement in In re Dillion, 919 F.2d 688, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
by judge Lourie regarding Durden did not help clarify the issue: "Durden did not hold
that all methods involving old process steps are obvious ... and [Durden] refused to
adopt an unvarying rule that the fact that nonobvious starting materials and nonobvious
products are involved ipso facto makes the process nonobvious." In re Dillion, 919 F.2d
at 695, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1903.
Although Dillion may be said to provide support for the proposition that Durden
does not create an absolute bar to every method claim on an old process based on obvi-
ousness, the issue still remains muddled, because how is one to determine whether Dur-
den or Pleuddemann applies with any degree of predictability. Furthermore, at least two
commentators have noted that three concurring judges refused to join the dicta regard-
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In re Pleuddeman dealt with patentability of a process of
using a silane coupling agent, a bonding/priming compound for
certain polymers and fillers." 5 The PTO had allowed claims to
the coupling agents and had allowed claims to the new articles
produced by using the new agents, but had rejected claims of
using the agents in a conventional process. "' The court held
that since the process claims concerned the process of using the
bonding/priming agents rather than the process of making the
said agents, the applicant was entitled to patent protection. " 7
The court relied upon In re Kuehl," 8 wherein the court permit-
ted patent claims to the process of using a new zeolite, ZK-22, as
a catalyst for cracking hydrocarbons." 9 Process patent protec-
tion in Kuehl was granted because, although the product, ZK22,
was used in the same manner as other zeolites found in the prior
art, the ZK-22 was not sufficiently similar to the zeolites known
to the prior art as to render the use of ZK-22 to crack hydrocar-
bons, obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.'
The court in Pleuddeman grounded its decision upon the
fact that the patentee in that case sought a patent on the pro-
cess of using the novel starting material. The court distinguished
the Durden decision on the ground that Durden involved the
obvious process of making a new insecticide, despite the fact
that both the starting materials and the final product were
novel;"' whereas, the patent at issue in Pleuddeman involved a
process of using novel bonding/priming agents."'2 The court rea-
soned that, since the use of the novel starting materials is an
inherent part of the materials, it cannot be separated from the
materials themselves, and therefore, the use of the materials
ing Durden and that three dissenting judges also stated that they could not join judge
Lourie's statement rearding Durden. Harold C. Wegner, Biotechnology Process Patents:
Judicial or Legislative Remedy, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 24 (1991); Louis S.
Sorell & Susan K. Lehnhardt, Current State of Law Regarding Biotechnology Process
Patents (1991) (unpublished, on file with author).
910 F.2d at 824, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
16 Id. at 825, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1740.
.. Id. at 827-28, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741-42.
475 F.2d 658, 177 U.S.P.Q. 250 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
19 In re Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d 823, 827, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1738, 1741 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
120 In re Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658, 663, 177 U.S.P.Q. 250, 254 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
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must also be novel. 123
In an effort to clarify the alleged distinction between the
instant case and Durden, the Pleuddeman court emphasized
that the patentee did not attempt to claim the process of mak-
ing a final product, filled resins, but of only using starting
materials; whereas, the patentee in Durden attempted to claim
the process of making a final product, novel insecticide. This
point is puzzeling, because is the court suggesting that the pat-
ent applicant in Durden would have been awarded method
claims if the applicant had argued he or she sought to claim the
use of the starting material to produce the final product. The
court further maintained that the applicant in Pleuddeman did
not seek to patent the process of making starting material.'12
This argument is inapposite, because the applicant in Durden
also did not seek to patent the process of making starting
material.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear how the court in one
breath can accept the reasoning in Durden and in another im-
plicitly accept the reasoning of In re Mancy.25 The Durden
court reasoned that a process is obvious if the novel starting ma-
terial and the starting material well known in the art, intended
for the same purpose, are so similar, it would have been obvious
to one skilled in the art to use the former in place of the latter
in the process of making the final product. The Mancy court
reasoned that a conventional process employing novel starting
material is not obvious, because one skilled in the art would
elect to use novel starting material in lieu of conventional start-
ing material only after one is apprised of its nature and composi-
tion, based on the patentee's application. 26 Therefore, it is
solely because of the distorting effects of hindsight that one
would make such a substitution. The Plueddeman court ac-
cepted the rationale of In re Mancy by its approval of the ra-
tionale of In re Kuehl.127 The Plueddeman court found both ap-
123 Id. at 825-26, 827, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741.
1I4 Id. at 827, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741.
122 499 F.2d 1289, 182 U.S.P.Q. 303 (1974).
120 In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289, 1292-93, 182 U.S.P.Q. 303, 305-06 (1974).
127 Plueddeman, 910 F.2d at 828, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741-42. The acceptance of In re
Kuehl necessarily involves the acceptance of In re Mancy because, in both cases it was




proaches to be sound, and intimated that both approaches can
be reconciled if one distinguishes between use and make. How-
ever, both Durden and Mancy dealt with the patentability of
conventional processes to make a final product.
Before embarking on a discussion of the wisdom of the
"make" and "use" distinction, an underlying premise of the fol-
lowing argument must be brought to the surface. There is a dis-
tinction between a method of making a novel final product that
employs no novel starting materials in the process and a method
of making a final product, novel or not, employing novel starting
material in the process of making the resulting product. It is the
latter form of making which Amgen Inc. sought a patent and
which is referred to throughout the discussion below.
The patentability of a process should not hinge upon
whether one is "using" starting material or "making" a final
product, because, in effect, the patentee is receiving process pat-
ent protection for the same thing. The coupling agents are in
essence starting material used in making the final products, fil-
led resins. If the patentee can only use the starting material for
one purpose, to make filled resin, then the patentee, when the
patentee's starting material is used, is actually receiving a patent
on the process of making filled resin in the usual way, which
according to Durden is impermissible. Even assuming the start-
ing material has other purposes, if one of them is to make filled
resins in a conventional manner, the patentee is still receiving a
patent on the process of making filled resins in the usual way
when the patentee's starting material is used.
The distinction between "make" and "use" is further obfus-
cated when one examines Plueddeman in light of Ex Parte Mac-
Adams. 28 Ex Parte MacAdams held that claims drawn to a con-
ventional method of using a novel composition are patentable. 129
There the court reasoned that it is not proper to determine the
obviousness of a process solely on whether the physical manipu-
lative steps, as applied to a known set of ingredients, are con-
one could decide to use new material in place of a similar starting material since the new
starting material was unknown before the applicant invented it.
128 206 U.S.P.Q. 445 (1978).
1 9 Id. at 448.
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ventional.'30 Rather, the court determined that since the novel
composition (the starting material) was unknown to the art
before the applicant invented it, the process of using it must be
nonobvious. However, as mentioned earlier, Durden overruled
Ex Parte MacAdams. Is MacAdams now to be regarded as
sound law and thus carry precedential value given the holding of
Plueddeman?
The word "make" is defined as "to cause to exist, occur, or
appear; to bring into being by forming, shaping, or altering ma-
terial: fashion; to put together from components: constitute."''
The word "use" is defined as "the act or practice of employing
something; a method or manner of employing or applying some-
thing."'132 For the purpose of determining the patentability of a
process, the distinction between make and use essentially
amounts to clever word juggling. Indeed the words are not syno-
nomous, and arguably there may be some conceptual difference
in terms of how the words are employed in the English language.
For example, one may "use" bricks to "make" a wall. One may
also "use" a wall to "make" a house. The terms are used differ-
ently depending on whether one is referring to a starting mate-
rial or an end product. Yet, the distinction between the two
words relates only to semantics and should be irrelevant for pat-
entability purposes.
To draw two separate categories of processes resting on the
distinction between the terms "make" and "use" would be sub-
ordinating substance to form. In order to avoid serious harm to
fledgling American Industry, rather than simply labeling a pro-
cess as either "make" or "use", the court should carefully ascer-
tain whether an inventor seeks to patent a process in which
novel starting material is brought into play or employed to pro-
duce some final product, regardless of the patentability of that
final product.
The legislature should establish patent protection for a pro-
cess of producing or making a product, if the starting material in
the process is novel and patentable. First, the patent monopoly
is narrowed when a claim to a conventional process is added to a
Id. at 447.
131 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1363 (1976).




claim to a new starting material.1 3 A patent to a well-known
process would not pre-empt the use of that process. Rather, such
a patent would only foreclose from others the use of that process
in conjunction with the patented starting material. Second, pat-
ent infringement litigation is not encouraged,' 34 because a patent
holder would not seek to prevent others from using an old pro-
cess as it was practiced in the prior art, but would attempt to
prevent others from using only an old process when it involves
patented starting material. Third, the inventor deprives society
of nothing which it enjoyed before his or her discovery, yet soci-
ety still enjoys the fruits of the invention and the inventor adds
to the sum of human knowledge. Finally, the proposed law will
not discourage any American firm from enterprise in a particular
field any more so than they are now, because American firms are
presently foreclosed from experimentation with respect to a
given process when it involves patented starting material. It is
worth repeating that, on the other hand, to date, foreign corpo-
rations do not risk a patent infringement suit if they appropriate
and infringe starting material when that is the only element of a
product which is patented. They are free to use and exploit any
patented starting material as long as the process or end product
is not patented. For this reason the present law permits a for-
eign corporation to deny an American inventor the fruits of his
or her invention and also to gain an unfair advantage over
American industry.
"I' In Bernhart the court observed:
Many cases have said that the combination claim reciting only one new element
with no new result is overclaiming or claiming more than the applicant invented.
Such statements are indeed puzzling in view of the fact that the addition of ele-
ments to a claim narrows its scope and thereby creates a lesser monopoly. Others
have said the combination is not new, or is obvious, if no new coaction or result is
obtained. This too is unsound, since it is not the result which is to be patented but
the recited machine, composition, etc. If the prior art does not show or suggest the
improved element itself, it defies logical reasoning to say that the same prior art
suggests the use of that improved element in a combination.
In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1402, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611, 618 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
'3' One author suggests problems may arise due to multiple patents covering the
same process and due to more complicated licensing arrangements. Kevin Kelly, The
Elimination of Process: Will the Biotechnology Patent Protection Act Revive Process
Patents?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 263, 290 (1990)
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VI. THE AFTERMATH FOLLOWING LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
The most obvious question is how would this case have been
decided under the proposed amendment to the patent laws.
Amgen would have applied for this new type of process patent,
just as it did originally. Yet, whereas before the PTO denied the
patent application on the authority of Durden, under the pro-
posed amendment Amgen would be awarded a patent on an old
process since the starting materials are novel (the host cells).
Thereafter, if Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. of Japan
were to import rEPO into the United States, Amgen would file a
complaint with the ITC alleging unfair trade practices. In turn,
the Commission would institute an investigation under section
1337(a). Amgen would be entitled to relief and the Commission
would issue an order excluding the importation of rEPO.
The question then becomes what new problems will present
themselves after the exclusion order goes into effect. Even as-
suming the patent holder, Amgen, licenses the patent to some
companies, there will still be fewer suppliers of rEPO than there
were before the order went into effect.135 Assuming Amgen does
not license the patent, there would only be one supplier of
rEPO, viz., Amgen.1 36 Assuming demand remains unchanged
from its present figure, the limited supply of rEPO would cause
the price of the product to increase. 13 7 In turn, hospitals and di-
alysis centers will have to pay more for the product."3 8 Accord-
ingly, the increased cost would be transferred to patients. Hence,
fewer persons may have access to the product.
There can be no doubt that this result is indeed a disadvan-
There will be less suppliers of rEPO assuming the exclusion order applies to all
foreign producers not just a particular defendant.
"" Currently, Amgen only licenses the Johnson & Johnson, Corp. to manufacture
rEPO. Telephone interview with Sally Crampton, supervisor in Trade Relations at
Amgen (July 19, 1991).
1" Demand pull inflation, as opposed to cost push inflation, should cause the price
of the product to rise since the market demand will exceed the supply. M. SPENCER,
CONTEMPORARY MACROECONOMICS, at 118-19 (6th. ed. 1986). For a full discussion of the
competing interests of providing incentives to inventors and ensuring that the public has
access to medical products, see Note, Patents For Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT
Case, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 145 (1990).
" The Amgen Corporation sells to drug wholesalers, who then sell the product to
hospitals and dialysis centers. Telephone interview with Sally Crampton, supervisor in




tage of the exclusion order. If the proposed amendment which
would give rise to such an exclusion order had no countervailing
advantages it would be undesirable as a matter of policy. How-
ever, the proposed amendment does have countervailing advan-
tages which outweigh any negative effects.
In the first place, the laws should afford Amgen fair treat-
ment. Amgen, like most other corporations, is in business for a
profit. In a free-enterprise, captalistic system, society expects an
enterprise to strive to become profitable and grow. As such, a
corporation should be allowed to reap the benefits of its ef-
forts.13 Foreign competition is free to apply for the same type of
patent protection as domestic industry."1 0 Indeed foreign com-
petitors are already afforded the type of patent protection at is-
sue here, in their own countries.""
Further, the law should provide inventors an incentive to
develop new products and processes in the biotechnology field."'
If the law is to remain consonant with the goal of providing in-
ventors an incentive to labor in endeavors fraught with the risk
of financial loss, additional proprietary protection is necessary in
this field. A single corporation may spend millions on a project
that may not prove sucessful at all or at best not provide a mar-
ketable item until after years of research.' ' s
139 For a discussion of the justications of the patent system and of the costs and
benefits attributable to the system, see A. Samuel Oddi, A Review of Recent Decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Beyond Obviousness: In-
vention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097 (1989).
"I As long as a foreign based corporation has money to pay lawyers it has the same
opportunities for patent protection and can apply for that protection just as easily as a
domestically-based firm. Japan retains almost as many District of Columbia-based lob-
bying/public relations law firms as those of Canada, Britain and the Netherlands com-
bined. Walter Shapiro, Is Washington in Japan's Pocket?, TtmE, Oct. 1, 1990 at 106, 107.
Japan spends approximately $100 million a year lobbying in Washington. Id.
4 1 136 CONG. REc. E207 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
42 At least one scholar has observed that a patent monopoly is the best inducement
available to encourage technological innovation. Donald F. Turner, The Patent System
and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 445 (1969) (Professor Turner argues that
patent monopolies result in wasted resources to some extent, because others attempt to
solve the same problem while attempting to avoid infringement.). Other commentators
have pointed to empirical studies which indicate that patent protection is the primary
incentive to technological development. Reid G. Adler, Controlling the Applications of
Biotechnology: A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Moratorium On Animal Patenting,
1-2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15 (1988-89).
143 Research in the field of biotechnology almost by definition requires an eye for
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The government has a strong interest in encouraging Ameri-
can companies to produce biotechnological products and to
maintain the lead in that field. Additional patent protection
would advance those government interests. If foreign competi-
tion eclipses the United States in biotechnology, the United
States may suffer from loss of jobs, loss of control of technology,
and a lower standard of living.14 1 While it may be beneficial to
society to have many manufacturers of a medical drug, 1 5 if Eu-
rope or Japan surpasses the United States in the biotechnology
industry, control of the price and supply of the products will be
in the hands of foreign competition. Thus, if the dominant com-
panies in this field are foreign corporations, the risk is created
that not only will there be fewer manufacturers of medical prod-
ucts, but that the United States will be at the beckon call of
these foreign corporations.
Of course the Act is intended to help American companies,
but this advantage does not mean that the proposed change to
the patent laws is somehow tainted with protectionism. It simply
provides certainty of reward. It acts as an incentive to American
biotechnological companies to aggressively find new applications
for genetic engineering.14 Thus, it furthers the Constitutional
the long-term view. A Wall Street Journal article on the Japanese plans in the biotech-
nology field was made part of the December 18, 1987 Congressional Record. 133 CONG.
REC. S18399 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1987). A portion of that article reads as follows:
For the U.S. recently bloodied by the Japanese in semiconductors, there is
reason for concern in [the Biotechnology] field, too. Biotech research consumes
much time and money, with any payback far in the future. This isn't a problem
for most of the Japanese players, because they tend to be huge corporations
loaded with cash from their other operations. But many of the most promising
American biotechnology firms are small and don't have any profitable business to
sustain them.
Equally important, in the Japanese corporate world a manager is free to take
a long-term approach, investing for years without showing any results.
Bernard Wysocki Jr., Gene Squad: Japanese Now Target Another Field The U.S.
Leads: Biotechnology, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1987, at 1.
"' "America's abilty to compete in a global marketplace is inextricably bound to her
capacity to protect creativity, inventors, and the established reputation of her products."
133 CONG. REC. E984 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep. Hou).
'4 While Drug firms may be among the most profitable in the United States, lim-
ited patent protection is not an intelligent measure to combat the high cost of certain
pharmaceuticals. One suggestion is to set maximum reimbursement levels for high-cost
pharmaceuticals. Janice Castro, Condition: Critical, TIME, Nov. 25, 1991, at 42.
146 "'[To have science flourish you want people who take chances.'" Leon Jaroff,




mandate that Congress promote "the Sciences and the Useful
Arts." 47
V. CONCLUSION
The Amgen case provides in crystalline form the problem in
U.S. trade laws. If our society expects inventors to improve our
standard of living, increase the number of jobs for our citizens,
and even help maintain our liberty, it must provide domestic in-
novators protection against the unfair trade practices of foreign
importers. '4"
We expect our biotechnology industry to produce prosthetic
devices, pharmaceutical products and industrial chemicals. If we
expect scientists and investors to actively seek to develop these
products, the laws must provide incentives and protection to en-
courage these groups to practice their art. If as a society we de-
termine that the biotechnology industry is not of sufficient social
utility to warrant more extensive patent protection, we may
have unwittingly chosen to stand by and watch another U.S. in-
dustry disappear in a tidal wave of foreign competition.
After the sun sets on another American industry, the critics
can point fingers and tirelessly write volumes about what should
have been done decades earlier.
John Christopher Hunt*
tor of Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York). But people do not take chances if
the rewards do not outweigh the risks.
147 Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Act would also further the policy behind the Process Patent
Amendments of 1988. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).
148 Leon Jaroff, Crisis in the Labs, TIME, Aug. 26, 1991, at 45 (quoting VANNEVAR
BusH, SCIENCE: THE ENDLESS FRONTIER (1945)).
* The author wishes to thank Lawrence G. Kastriner, who reviewed the manuscript.
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